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Remembering the Role ofJustice in
Resolution: Insights from Procedural
and SocialJustice Theories
Nancy A. Welsh
It is surely a luxury, at this point in the field of dispute resolution, to be
invited to identify those concepts that I view as absolutely essential to our
canon. Borrowing a bit from Chris Guthrie's wine illustration, I think it is fair
to suggest that today's presentations reveal a very impressive wine cellar, with
many bottles of fine wine from which to choose. I will spotlight one part of this
wine cellar, where concepts regarding procedural and social justice theories
can be found. I will focus primarily on procedural justice but will also reference those theories of social justice that link these two dimensions ofjustice,
particularly in a democracy.
I begin, however, with a plea. For a while now, it has seemed to me that
justice has been increasingly marginalized as a sweet, old-fashioned notion
that is not viewed as an essential component of the dispute resolution canon.
Instead, our canon, our teaching, and our scholarship focus increasingly on
the different mechanisms that enable negotiators and mediators to get the
deals they desire. Partisan perceptions, loss aversion, risk aversion, reactive
devaluation, framing, anchoring-these are the concepts drawn from social
and cognitive psychology that seem to capture our current imaginations. The
examination of these and other examples of cognitive and emotional vulnerability enables us, like trainers of sales representatives, to teach our students to
be more effective in their efforts at persuasion. These concepts, and our
pedagogical embrace of them, also have the potential to legitimize manipulation.
Of course, effective persuasion is a key function of every lawyer and part of
every dispute resolution process. The current balance in emphasis is troubling, however, when I consider that we as law teachers serve as mentors for
students who will soon take their places in a system that has as its mission the
provision ofjustice. Ever since I was asked to present as part of this panel, I
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have heard echoes from the 1960s and 1970s. One phrase in particular has
relevance to our field today: "There can be no peace without justice." Though
we may congratulate ourselves on the success that our field has experienced,
we should also acknowledge that there can be no real or lasting resolution
unless sufficient attention is paid to justice.
Why does it seem so difficult to talk aboutjustice within our field of dispute
resolution? I am reminded of a couple of Canadian attorneys' responses to
Julie Macfarlane and her associate Ellen Travis, as they conducted research on
the impact of court-connected mediation.' Asked to differentiate between a
"good" outcome and a 'Just" outcome, one attorney answered: "There's no
justice; it's just a game. What are you, new? That's a really funny question."
The other attorney responded more pithily: 'Justice is way too deep for me."2
Perhaps justice is a notion that has no real relevance to today's system of
dispute resolution or is so undefinable and unattainable that thinking about it
generates more self-doubt than clarity.' Perhaps the field of dispute resolution
need not focus on justice because we are confident in our faith that the
disputants (particularly in consensual processes, but even in the selection of
nonconsensual processes like arbitration) are definingjustice for themselves
as part of their exercise of self-determination-and frankly doing a better job
4
of it than anyone else could do for them.
Or perhaps-as Owen Fiss suggested over two decades ago-we hesitate to
wrestle with the place of justice in dispute resolution because we have not
quite grasped the implications of our field's successful and thorough institutionalization in our nation's courts and public agencies.5 As we introduce our
students to mediation and arbitration, for example, we still tend to invoke
one-on-one disputes that include many of the following characteristics: the
disputants are peers; they are able to exercise self-determination and thus able
to control the outcome; they have or could have a beneficial relationship; they
live or work in a community that will benefit from resolution and harmony;
they have voluntarily and knowingly chosen to pursue an alternative to the
courts or public agencies; and they participate without attorneys but with their
own visions of justice. For many of us, the mediation of a neighborhood
dispute frames our (and our students') understanding of the primary purposes and process of mediation. Similarly, many of us understand and intro-

1.

See Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory CourtConnected Mediation, 2002J. Disp. Resol. 241.

2.

E-mail correspondence from Julie Macfarlane to Nancy Welsh (Aug. 31, 2003) (on file with
author).

3.

See alsojudith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process andJudicial
Preferences for Settlement, 2002J. Disp. Resol. 155, 165.

4.

Id. But see Jean Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh
Amendment Right to ajury Trial, 16 Ohio St.J. on Disp. Resol. 669, 673-74 (2001).

5.

See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J.1073, 1076-78, 1089 (1984). Fiss's concerns
about ADR and settlement bear a second look in light of the successful institutionalization of
ADR,but it must also be noted that his rosy assessment of litigation can be criticized-and
has been -for its lack of realism. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of
Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1159, 1172-73 (1995).
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duce arbitration primarily as a tool developed by and for equal and independent merchants who place primary emphasis upon efficient and cost-effective
resolution.
Yet these iconic images (rather like the image of the jury trial6 ) reflect small
and increasingly isolated segments of the current practice of mediation and
arbitration. The teaching of dispute resolution is now an integral part of many
law school curricula precisely because courts, agencies, and corporations have
embraced mediation and arbitration to resolve a wide variety of family, personal injury, contract, employment, consumer, and regulatory disputes. Most
of these disputes do not involve peers, or desired relationships, or communities. The empirical evidence that is developing in court-connected mediation
reveals that many of these disputants have not voluntarily chosen mediation;
they have been ordered or "encouraged" to participate in the process. These
disputants generally are accompanied by their attorneys, and-except in
family disputes-the attorneys are likely to dominate the discussions. 7 Very
frequently, the mediators are also attorneys who will disclose their own thoughts
regarding the 'justice" that will be meted out by the courts.8 From these and
other pieces of data,9 it is not so clear that the disputants in these mediation
sessions perceive they have any more actual control-or self-determinationin mediation than they do in adjudicated processes. It is not so clear that the
disputants' definitions of justice play an important role in the process. Ultimately, it is not so clear that we can or should cling to our old assumptions and
expectations about the place of the "alternative" field of dispute resolution,
particularly as that field has become imbedded within the social institutions
that are responsible for deliveringjustice.
I would argue that the evolution and institutionalization of mediation-as
well as the courts' embrace and enforcement of mandatory arbitration outside
the commercial context-reveal the danger of defining our field solely in
terms of "resolution." Over the years, we have revisited and debated the
meaning of the A in ADR. 11 It is now time, in this new world, to examine the
sufficiency of the R. I offer a plea that we as law teachers begin and infuse our
dispute resolution courses with a commitment to both resolution andjusticc.
If that is so, let us begin by examining the classic concept of procedural
justice, which should be part of every dispute resolution course-and part of

6.

See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A.J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 24.

7.

See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What'sJustice Got to Do
with It? 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 787, 801-03 (2001) [hereinafter Making Deals]; Nancy A. Welsh,
Reconciling Self-Determination, Coercion and Settlement in Court-Connected Mediation,
in Mediating Family and Divorce Disputes: Current Practices and Applications (for thcoming
2004) [hereinafter Reconciling].

8.

See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 805-06; Welsh, Reconciling, supra note 7.

9.

See Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow
Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002J. Disp. Resol. 179, 181-84.

10. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 Geo. L.J. 2663, 2689-90 (1995) (urging that
appropriate should replace alternative in describing mediation and other nontrial dispute
resolution processes).
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the evaluation of every dispute resolution process. What is procedural justice?
Is it enough to say that dispute resolution processes just ought to "feel" fair?
How far does that get us? How do we know whether a dispute resolution
process will feel fair?
Substantial research has been done in this area by social psychologists
building on the pioneering work ofJohn Walker and Laurens Thibault' and
on more recent research and theories developed by Allan Lind and Tom
Tyler. 12That research has revealed four procedural elements that reliably lead
people to conclude that a dispute resolution process is procedurally fair: the
process provides an opportunity for the disputants to express their views
(generally described as "an opportunity for voice");' the third party demonstrates consideration of what the disputants have said;14 the third party treats
the disputants in an even-handed way and tries to be fair;15 and the third party
treats the disputants with dignity and respect.1 6 Very recent research arising
out of the U.S. Postal Service REDRESS employment mediation program
(which uses a transformative model of mediation that focuses upon enhancing disputants' interaction rather than achieving resolution) has shown that
the disputants also care very much about the procedural justice they receive
from each other, perhaps even more than they care about the procedural justice
offered by the third-party mediator.' All of these results suggest that both the
presence of a mediator and the mediator's guidance of the disputants' interaction have the potential to bring procedural justice to the hard bargaining
that often characterizes settlement negotiations.
The procedural justice literature further indicates that disputants' perceptions of procedural justice can have profound effects. The procedural elements described briefly above do more than just make disputants feel good. In
fact, disputants are more likely to conclude that they have received distributive
11.

See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 7-40 (New
York, 1988) [hereinafter Social Psychology]; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural
Justice, in Handbook ofJustice Research in Law, eds.Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, 65,
69-70 (New York, 2001) [hereinafter Procedural Justice]; Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of
Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 295 (1974);
Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 841-43.

12. See Lind & Tyler, Social Psychology, supra note 11, at 61-127; E. Allan Lind, Procedural
Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in Everyday Practices and Trouble
Cases, eds. Austin Sarat et al, 177 (NewYork, 1998) (hereinafter Everyday Practices]; Tyler &
Lind, Procedural Justice, supra note 11, at 70-74. See also Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M.
Brett, Comparing Three Processes Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field
Study of Mediation and Arbitration, 65J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1167 (1993); E. Allan
Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in
the CivilJustice System, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 953 (1990).
13. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 820-22, 841-44.
14. Id. at 820-23.
15. Id. at 821-24.
16. Id. at 820-26.
17. Tina Nabatchi & Lisa Bingham, Expanding Our Models ofJustice in Dispute Resolution: A
Field Test of the Contribution of Interactionaljustice (paper presented at conference of the
International Association for Conflict Management,June 9-12, 2002) (on file with author).
18. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7.
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justice 9 to the extent that they perceive that they have been treated in a
procedurallyjust way. They are more likely to comply with the outcome of the
dispute resolution process if they feel that they have been treated fairly. And, if
people perceive that a process was procedurally just, they are more likely to
view the social institution that provided the process as legiiimate.2 ° This last
consequence of disputants' perceptions of proceduraljustice appears particularly important as formerly alternative processes for dispute resolution become imbedded within significant social institutions.
Several theories have been developed to explain why people care so much
about procedural justice. Three are especially noteworthy and are supported
by research. Walker and Thibault originally theorized that people cared about
procedural justice because they wanted to be sure that they were given a
meaningful opportunity to influence the outcome of the dispute resolution
process." The U.S. Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence reflects this
"instrumental" or "social exchange" theory as a means of understanding the
significance of procedural justice.2 For the Court, procedural safeguards
matter only to the extent that they contribute to achieving reasonably accurate and just decisions.2 3 More recent research has shown, however, that the
opportunity for voice has an importance that stands on its own. Indeed,
researchers found that people cared about the opportunity for voice even
when they knew that they could not influence the outcome.24 Lind and Tyler
developed the "group value" theory, which explains that people "read" their
interactions with third parties to discern whether the third party (who represents an important social institution) values and respects them. The unfolding
of the procedure itself, therefore, manifests the individual disputant's place
within society.22
Most recently, Allan Lind has bridged the social exchange and group value
theories of procedural justice by proposing that people use their perceptions
of procedures' fairness as a heuristic, or mental shortcut, to determine whether
they received substantivejustice. Disputants make commonsensejudgments
about the extent to which they were allowed to express themselves and
whether the decision maker considered what they said and treated them in an
evenhanded and dignified manner. They then use those perceptions to reach
conclusions about whether the procedure is likely to yield a substantively fair

19. Focusing on the substantive fairness of the outcomes themselves. See Morton Deutsch,
Justice and Conflict, in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution, eds. Morton Deutsch & Peter
T. Coleman, 41, 41-44 (San Francisco, 2000).
20. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 818-20.
21. Id. at 826-27.
22. See Welsh, supra note 9, at 187-91; Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 46-48 (1976).
23. See Welsh, supranote 9, at 187-91.
24. See Lind, supra note 12, at 180-81.
25. See Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 827-29.
26. See Lind, supra note 12, at 177; Tyler & Lind, Procedural Justice, supra note 11, at 77-81.
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outcome. Is this just another example of the "absurd and ridiculous" heuristics that Chris Guthrie described earlier? To the extent that the indicia of
procedural justice can be manipulated, yes.- 7 But it is important to recall that
heuristics, though sometimes flawed, generally work quite well to assist us in
understanding and operating within a complex world. Cross-cultural and
intergroup research, for example, may support the connection drawn by
Lind's "fairness heuristic theory"28 between procedure and outcome. Such
research suggests that when conflicts arise, people are more likely to be openminded and respectful in dealing with those they perceive as members of their
in-group. 29 Research also suggests that human beings are likely to treat members of their in-group substantively better than they treat outsiders.,, Thus, the
tenor of our interaction with each other as we try to resolve disputes may
indeed predict (or perhaps even predispose31 ) substantive fairness.
This brings us to theories of social justice and their place in the canon of
dispute resolution. In embracing dispute resolution processes, are society's
major social, political, legal, and economic institutions serving the goal of
socialjustice? Is the field of dispute resolution contributing to the just distribution of "the burdens and benefits of social cooperation among the members of society"?32 Owen Fiss and others have argued that the informality and
privatization of "alternative" dispute resolution actually are antithetical to the
achievement of social justice.3 Limited research comparing litigated and
mediated outcomes in court-connected mediation has raised serious concerns
about the substantive justice that people of color receive when their mediators
are from the majority culture.34 But simultaneously a significant number of
mediation advocates have explained the emergence and significance of mediation in terms of "the social justice story"-the potential of the mediation
process to empower and organize the powerless."5
Part of the difficulty in discerning a clear connection between the field of
dispute resolution and the goal of social justice lies in a lack of consensus on
27. See Nancy A. Welsh & Barbara Gray, Searching for a Sense of Control: The Challenge
Presented byCommunity Conflicts over Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 10 Penn.
St. Envtl. L. Rev. 295, 306 (2002); Tyler & Lind, Procedural Justice, supra note 11, at 80.
28.

Tyler & Lind, ProceduralJustice, supra note 11, at 77.

29.

See Keith Allred, Anger and Retaliation in Conflict, in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution,
supra note 19; Ronald Fisher, Intergroup Conflict, in The Handbook of Conflict Resolution,
supra note 19, at 170-74.

30.

See Kwok Leung & Michael Morris,Justice Through the Lens of Culture and Ethnicity, in
Handbook ofJustice Research in Law, supra note 11, at 369.

31.

See Allred, supra note 29, at 250.

32. Allen Buchanan, A Critical Introduction to Rawls' Theory ofJustice, inJohn Rawls' Theory of
Social Justice: An Introduction, eds. H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith, 3, 7 (Athens,
Ohio, 1980) [hereinafterJohn Rawls' Theory].
33. Fiss, supra note 5, at 1076-78, 1085.
34. See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on
Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 767, 789
(1996).
35. See Robert A. Barich Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to
Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition 18-19 (San Francisco, 1994).
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the criteria that determine the existence of social (or distributive) justice."
Indeed, in a democracy, the definition of socialjustice is likely to be subject to
constant change and evolution. This essay will illustrate the insights available
from only one of the available social justice theories,"7John Rawls's theory of
justice as fairness, which he developed in part as a reaction against
utilitarianism's focus upon the maximization of aggregate or average utility."
Rawls, who grounds his theory in the ideals of democracy, asks: "[V]iewing
society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and
equal, what principles of justice are most appropriate to specify basic rights
and liberties, and to regulate social and economic inequalities in citizens'
prospects over a complete life?"39 He then proposes the following principles
that should characterize ajust social order:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of
liberties for all; and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they
are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of
40
the least-advantaged members of society ....
On the basis of these two principles, Rawls views society's major social,
political, legal, and economic institutions (which he calls the "basic structure") as having two primary roles: specifying and assuring that all citizens
have basic liberties, and providing background institutions of social and
economic justice in the form most appropriate to citizens seen as free and
equal. 4 In a society guided by Rawls's two principles, social and procedural
justice then seem to merge: "The basic structure is arranged so that when
everyone follows the publicly recognized rules of cooperation, and honors the
claims the rules specify, the particular distributions of goods that result are
acceptable as just (or at least as not unjust) whatever these distributions turn
out to be."42

Social and proceduraljustice merge further when one examines the extent
to which the two primary roles of the "basic structure" are inevitably interde36. See Deutsch, supra note 19, at 41 (describing distributive justice). Many theories have been
developed to serve as the bases for defining ajust society, including utilitarianism, liberalism,
socialism, libertarianism and communitarianism, to namejust a few.
37. There are other approaches, besides that of Rawls, which also have potential links to
proceduralijustice in their elaboration of social justice. See, e.g. Georgia Warnke,Justice and
Interpretation (Cambridge,Mass., 1993) (critical
hermeneutics); JfIrgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Lam, and Democracy, trans.
William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass., 1996) (discourse theory); Alasdair Machntyre, After Virtue:
A Study in Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, 1984) (Aristotelian virtue ethics as the
development of a tradition),
38. See Buchanan, supra note 32, at 6.
39. John Rawls,Justice as Fairness: ARestatement 41 (Cambridge, Mass. 2001) (emphasis added)
[hereinafterJustice as Fairness]. See alsoJohn Rawls, ATheory ofJustice (Cambridge, Mass.,
1971);John Rawls, Political Liberalism (NewYork, 1996).
40. Rawls,Justice as Fairness, supra note 39, at 42-43.
41.

Id. at 48.

42. Id. at 50.
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pendent. If citizens are secure in their basic liberties-e.g., freedom of thought,
liberty of conscience, freedom of association-determining the "most appropriate" form of social and economic justice "can be adjudicated, though not
always properly, within the existing political framework."4 Indeed, Rawls
asserts that society's institutions are responsible for educating citizens in the
exercise of their liberties in order to permit them to fulfill their political
responsibility to engage in the public culture. 4 But the reality of citizens'
freedom and equality is also dependent upon the achievement of social and
economic justice. Rawls writes that the accumulation of great wealth and
property in the hands of a few is very likely "to undermine fair equality of
opportunity, the fair value of the political liberties, and so on."45 This political
concern explains Rawls's argument that society should "compare schemes of
cooperation by seeing how well off the least advantaged are under each
scheme, and then ... select the scheme under which the least advantaged are
better off than they are under any other scheme."46
Rawls's theory of justice as fairness aids in understanding both the social
justice promise and critique of the field of dispute resolution. To begin with
the promise, much of the enthusiasm for "alternative" dispute resolution
arose out of popular dissatisfaction with the courts. The costs associated with
litigation and the delay in reaching trial made public adjudication virtually
inaccessible to many citizens. Some citizens also questioned the legitimacy of
attorneys' and judges' dominance over the litigation process and their control
over the norms to be used for decision making.47 Viewing these concerns
through the prism of Rawls's analysis, it could be argued that dispute resolution advocates perceived the courts as failing to operate in a manner that
assured all citizens the opportunity to exercise their basic liberties, particularly the right to trial and the right to free expression, which are essential for
the achievement of political and social justice.
The courts' embrace of mediation and arbitration may thus be seen as an
attempt to find other legitimate mechanisms that would allow citizens to
exercise these liberties, at least to an acceptable degree. Both mediation and
arbitration offer citizens the opportunity for free expression-perhaps even
freer expression than is available in the courts-and the opportunity to reason
together. Isabelle R. Gunning has highlighted this connection between mediation, social justice, and procedural justice in urging that disadvantaged
people "need, even more so than advantaged group members, a forum in

43.

Id. at 49. Rawls, unlike most attorneys, seems to use adjudication to include all forms of
political deliberation and decision making.

44. Id. at 56,

45. Id. at 53.
46. Id. at 60. It is noteworthy that Rawls does riot demand equality, just the scheme that most
improves the position of those who may still be described as the least advantaged.
47. See NancyA. Welsh, The ThinningVision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 15-18; Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Story of Arbitration Law, 14, No. 6 World Arb. & Mediation Rpt. 162, 163
(June 2003); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 274-76.
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which their authentic voices and experiences can be expressed" and that
mediation, as a forum fostering the expression of such authentic voices, offers
"another locus in American political, social and legal life where ideas about
equality are defined and redefined."4 Each mediation session thus represents
a powerful, individualized opportunity for citizens to grapple directly with the
law and engage in the mutual deliberation and decision making so prized by
Rawls. Depending upon a mediator's management of the disputants' interaction, a mediation session also can offer citizens an empowering "civic education"'4 9 in the respect, responsibility, and dialog that "fair and equal" citizens
extend to each other and that ease public deliberation and decision making.5"
Dispute resolution processes that occur in the public eye-such as regulatory
negotiation and consensus decision making-even more clearly seem to support and enhance citizens' role in public deliberation.5
The primary social justice critiques of "alternative" dispute resolution,
however, are that mediation, arbitration, and the other processes do not
actually deliver free, equal, and public participation and thus cannot be
expected to deliver socially just results. First, critics argue that mediation and
arbitration do not effectively protect disputants from preexisting social, political, and economic inequalities. 2 The resulting incorporation of such inequalities means that disadvantaged disputants cannot truly engage as equals
in the deliberation and decision making that occur within a dispute resolution
process. 53 Second, because these dispute resolution processes and their outcomes often are private, the broader citizenry is unable to engage in public
discussion and deliberation.54 Last, because the freedom and equality of the
disputants are not guaranteed and their deliberations are not public, critics
argue that there is no assurance that the resulting "distribution of goods [will
be] just (or at least not unjust)." These questions of whether the field of
dispute resolution-particularly as it has become integrated into the courts
and public agencies-provides forums that effectively "aspire[] to an au-

48. Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995J. Disp. Resol. 55,
67, 86 (1995).
49. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An
Imaginary Conversation, 3J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 11 (1989-90).
50- See Jonathan Cohen, Let's Put Ourselves Out of Business: On Respect, Responsibility and
Dialogue in Dispute Resolution, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 227 (2003).
51.

See Tyler & Lind, Procedural Justice, supra note 11, at 86-88.

52. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 1076-78, 1089; Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1359,
1400-04; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 Yale L.J.
1545, 1600-10 (1999). See also Eric Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone? 36 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1055 (1996).
53. This criticism bears some similarity to critics' attack on Rawls's "original position" in which
agents deliberate behind the "veil of ignorance." See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair
Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. Rev.
485, 531-39 (2003); Louis Katzner, The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance, inJohn
Rawls' Theory, supra note 32, at 42.
54. See Sternlight, supra note 4, at 839; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 10, at 2670.
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tonomy from distributional inequality" 55 and that truly encourage public
deliberation and decision making are important ones. Indeed, Rawls's theory
ofjustice as fairness helps to explain some critics' calls for a reexamination of
"alternative" dispute resolution and a renewed focus on making democratically selected judges and juries more accessible on a timely basis and at a
reasonable cost. 56 Perhaps it is true that if such access could be assured,
citizens would be less likely to resolve their cases through settlement, and
courtrooms would resume their role as central sites for citizens (as parties,
jurors, and observers) to engage directly in the public deliberation and decision making that should characterize a democratic nation.57 At this moment in
the evolution of institutionalized dispute resolution, we just do not know.
Law students certainly can be encouraged to learn and grapple with these
theories of procedural and socialjustice. For example, at the beginning of my
Dispute Resolution and Civil Procedure courses, I ask students to imagine that
they have been accused of an honor code violation and will soon appear
before a faculty member who will make a recommendation to the dean. As
they imagine the proceeding before this person, what do the students hope
will happen? How do they hope to be treated? And why does that treatment
matter to them?58 Reliably, the students mention the four indicia of procedural justice outlined above and describe in their own words the underlying
theories that have been developed to explain the importance of this dimension of justice. Their responses offer a rich segue into a discussion of the
procedural justice literature. This exercise works, in part, because it draws
upon students' own experiences of vulnerability and thus places them in a
situation in which they are likely to notice and care about the procedures used
by authorities for decision making.59
If we hope to do more than introduce procedural and social justice and
actually infuse our dispute resolution courses with these concepts, we can
return to justice concerns (along with concerns about efficiency and effective
persuasion) as we evaluate every simulation or process. It is also possible to
develop simulations that specifically encourage a focus on procedural and
socialjustice. For example, I have adapted a mediation simulation, originally
developed by Kimberlee Kovach,' that is based on a real mediation of a civil

55. Fiss, supranote 5, at 1078.
56. See Deborah Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 165 (2003); Deborah
Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002J. Disp. Resol. 81,9699; Resnik, supra note 3.
57. SeeJudith Resnik, Trial as ErrorJurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article
II, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 1034 (2000).
58. This represents a variation of Babcock and Massaro's problem case, "The Due Process
Game." Barbara Babcock & Toni Massaro, Civil Procedure: Cases and Problems, 2d ed., 1
(Gaithersburg, 2001).
59. This is to counteract the disconnect that can afflict the attorney-client relationship. See
Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 7, at 840; Deborah Hensler, The Real World of Tort
Litigation, in Everyday Practices, supra note 12, at 155.
60. "The Death Case" (unpublished classroom simulation) (on file with author).
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rights action brought by the parents of a slain teenager against several police
officers, a city, and its police department.6 In this simulation I specifically
instruct the mediator to share her evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses
of the plaintiffs case-accurately but also very early and very aggressively.
Because the students playing the parents of the slain child can find it difficult
to identify with this role, I provide them with extensive instructions, including
the language from actual hearing transcripts in which the parents described
the effects of their son's death and what they hoped to accomplish through
their lawsuit. The debrief generally is quite good after this mediation simulation and necessarily leads to important discussions about the procedural and
social justice implications of different approaches to mediation.
There are other ways to adapt existing simulations such as these to highlight for students the choices that sometimes need to be made between
resolution and justice. Caucus, for example, is an important tool that deserves
closer examination by those of us in the legal academy.62 As Jennifer Brown
observed earlier, this technique can be very effective for overcoming strategic
barriers to resolution. As we debrief simulations with our students, we can ask
them to evaluate the effect of caucus upon such barriers; we can also ask them
to consider the effect of caucus upon the disputants' perceptions of procedural justice and the likelihood of achieving social justice. Similarly, we can
direct students' attention to the significance of context. Do students' procedural and social justice concerns change if the mediation they are simulating
is voluntary rather than mandatory? How are their perceptions affected by the
knowledge that the mediation is part of a court-connected or agencysponsored program? To what extent do such changes in context also change
disputants' expectations of procedural and social justice? Are such expectations legitimate?
Ultimately, invoking the theories of procedural and social justice developed by social psychologists and political philosophers can help us and our
students explore the relevance ofjustice in a field devoted to resolution. The
waters ofjustice may indeed be "deep," as that Canadian attorney pronounced.
It is up to us to help our students dive in and start swimming.

61. See Welsh, supra note 47, at 7-15.
62. See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with
Real Disputants About the Place, Value and Meaning of Mediation, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 573, 669-71 (2004).

